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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HOWARD F. SEYBOLD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

I

7641

UNION pACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
J.
Defendant and Respondent. •

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
The parties will be referred to herein as they appeared in the lower court. Figures in parenthesis are the
page number of the record.
The statement of facts in the plaintiff's brief is accepted by the defendant, except that it is incomplete. Actually, we believe that a full understanding of the evidence
in this case can be arrived at only by reading the entire
record. A brief statement of the facts is in this case of
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questionable assistance and might be misleading. On page
8 of their brief counsel for the plaintiff state that the
defendant introduced "the usual railroad evidence." Again
on page 9 of their brief counsel state: "The railroad testimony here was just a little too good to be believed
* * *." Counsel apparently infer that the defendant
fabricated its defense. We can readily agree with them
that no reasonable person could read the entire record and
not conclude that one side or the other in this case presented testimony which was false. The discrepancies between the plaintiff's testimony and that of the six witnesses for the defendant are such that they just can't be
explained on the basis of honest mistakes. It is true that
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and against
the defendant; but we believe that an examination of the
complete record will disclose to any reasonable person that
the jury did so not because they believed or could have
believed the plaintiff's testimony, but rather in spite of
their disbelief of that testimony. It is true, also, that the
law recognizes that the testimony of a single interested
witness might be entitled to belief against the contrary
testimony of a dozen or more disinterested witnesses. That
rule has no application, however, where the testimony of
the single witness is so unlikely and so contrary to the
great weight of the evidence and the physical facts and
the general experience of mankind as to be unworthy of
belief. If the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict because it
concluded that no reasonable jury could possibly believe
the defendant's testimony, such a conclusion would be jus-
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tified. The rules of law concerning the conduct of a trial
are neither so technical nor so strict as to leave the trial
court helpless before an unjust verdict.
Counsel for the plaintiff in effect charge the defendant with permitting and encouraging, if not participating
in, criminal conduct before the trial court. Such a charge
cannot remain unchallenged. It emphasizes the need for
a careful scrutiny of the entire record in order that the
Supreme Court may itself evaluate the worth of the conflicting evidence. The following facts not adequately covered by counsel for the plaintiff in their brief are worthy
of emphasis, although they, too, are insufficient to present
a complete picture of the evidence.
The main portion of the town of Roberts, where the
railroad crossing in question is located, is on Highway 91,
which highway was parallel to and 79 feet distant from
the defendant's Team Track and 122 feet from the Passing
Track (37, 127). The flasher signal where the plaintiff
claims he stopped his truck is 15 feet west from the center
of the Team Track ( 127) . There were several electric
lights burning on the various stores fronting Highway 91
(38, 128-130). There was an arc light burning just south
of the crossing ( 128). There was a second arc light burning east of Highway 91 between the highway and the Team
Track and about 300 feet north of the crossing ( 129) . The
trackage area in defendant's yards at Roberts was visible
from the sidewalk on the west side of Highway 91 (143,
130). The following witnesses testified there was a light
on the front of the caboose which collided with the truck
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plaintiff was driving: Enos Ray, Conductor, who was
standing on the crossing and had a clear view of the caboose as it approached (63, 64) ; Gerald Sullivan, Engineer, who was in the cab of the defendant's engine and
saw lights on the caboose when it was kicked down toward
the crossing (101); Howard Kunze, Brakeman, who testified he was riding on the front or sopth end of the caboose,
and who stated there were marker lights on the southwest
corner thereof and that he himself carried an electric lantern which he was waving (112, 114, 121) ; George Dutson,
who was working in a store on the west side of Highway
91 (136, 137); and Joe Tirre, who was standing on the
sidewalk between a tavern and a hotel on the west side
of Highway 91 (143). The plaintiff testified on direct
examination that he approached the railroad crossing, saw
the flasher lights operating, observed the engine north of
the crossing on the main line track, concluded this engine
was making the flasher .signals operate and so proceeded
over the crossing, keeping his eyes on the engine and the
road ahead (20). He saw the caboose at a glance only for
not more than a second before the collision and he did not
notice any lights on it (21). On cross examination he testified he knew there were three tracks at this crossing; did
not look north along the Team Track as he proceeded over
this track; did look to the north along the Passing Track,
but the locomotive headlight was flashing across the crossing and he did not see anything ( 39) . He further testified
there was no man on the caboose, although he did not have
time to make proper observation since his first and only
glance at the caboose was when it was 6 or 7 feet away
and he had to look awfully fast (39, 40).
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THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
The plaintiff's evidence with respect to the alleged
negligence on the part of the defendant \Vas so meager and
speculative, and the defendant's evidence to the contrary
was so overwhelming, that we feel the trial court would
probably have been justified in granting the defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because
of a failure of proof on this issue, alone. However, the
defendant does not now rely upon the plaintiff's failure
to prove that defendant was negligent, nor do we believe
the trial court relied upon such a failure of proof in granting judgment to the defendant. The controlling issue in
this case-the one which we believe prompted the court
to grant its judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the
only issue that need be analyzed to demonstrate the correctness of the court's action-is the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Therefore, without conceding the validity of the plaintiff's argument with respect
to the defendant's negligence, we shall confine this. brief
to a consideration of the plaintiff's own negligence which
was a contributing cause of this crossing accident, if not
the sole cause thereof.
In our analysis of this issue we accept, of course, the
fundamental rule asserted by counsel for the plaintiff that
on this appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. However, to this rule must
be added the equally elementary qualification that it is apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plicable only as to conflicting evidence which creates a
question to be resolved by the jury.
The plaintiff's conduct must be analyzed in the light
of all the circumstances. It appears to us there are only
three possible views that anyone can take as to the facts
revealed by the evidence in this case. The circumstances
surrounding the accident might have been such as disclosed by the overwhelming evidence introduced by the
defendant; the circumstances might have been such as disclosed by the plaintiff's evidence ; or the circumstances might
have been as related by the plaintiff, except only as to his
testimony that there were no lights on the defendant's caboose. Analysis of the plaintiff's conduct separately in the
light of each of these three possible views with respect to
the circumstances of the accident will lead to the same
conclusion-that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.

A. The Plaintiff was Guilty of Contributory Negligence as a Matter of Law if the Evidence of the Defendant was True.
Several witnesses testified that the crossing where
this accident occurred was well lighted and the flasher
warning signal was operating; that the defendant's engine
was more than 400 feet north of the crossing; that there
were lights on the caboose and one of defendant's employes
was standing on the leading platform of the caboose waving a lighted lantern in his hand and yelling to warn the
plaintiff; that another of defendant's employes was standing on the crossing with a lantern in his hand which he
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was waving at the plaintiff; and finally, that the plaintiff
failed to see or ignored all of these warnings but proceeded
heedlessly over the crossing and into collision with the caboose. If plaintiff's conduct is measured in the light of
such evidence, it is clear that he failed to satisfy the standard of care which the law imposed upon him. This is so
clear as to obviate citation of authorities or further analysis.
In the event the court feels the defendant is not entitled to have its evidence considered to the exclusion of
that presented by the plaintiff, it will be necessary to
analyze the plaintiff's conduct in the light of the other
two possible views of the evidence.

Plaintiff Was Guilty of Contributory Negligence
as a Matter of Law if the Evidence of the Plaintiff is Accepted as True, Save Only as Plaintiff Testified there were
No Lights on the Caboose.
B.

We believe this view of the evidence, which is the third

possibility mentioned above, was the one which was. taken
by the trial court. We believe that it is the view which
should be taken by the Supreme Court on this appeal. The
plaintiff testified there were no lights on the front end
of the caboose. But even if all of the plaintiff's other testimony is accepted as true, this statement should be rejected because plaintiff's limited opportunity. for observa~
tion and his mental attitude at the moment of observation
render it insufficient to raise a conflict with the testimony
of defendant's witnesses that the caboose was lighted.
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This argument involves consideration of the law with
respect to the sufficiency of negative testimony. Of course,
negative testimony should not be disregarded merely because it is negative. Frequently, there is no way for a
plaintiff in a negligence action to prove his case except
by negative testimony, since proof of negligence often involves proof of a negative. It is nonetheless true that such
evidence must be accepted with caution; that while the
jury has the function of determining its weight, still it is
for the court first to determine its sufficiency; and that
rather definite standards have been established in this jurisdiction and elsewhere to test such sufficiency. It is the
defendant's position that the trial court should have and
did determine that the plaintiff's testimony failed to meet
such standards and could not therefore be considered to
raise a dispute as to the fact in this regard.
Most of the cases dealing with this subject involve the
question as to whether or not audible signals were given.
In principle, however, such cases are identical with the
present one. Each involves the reliability of human sensory
perception-in one case the reliability of the ear, and in
the other, that of the eyes.
In Russell v. Watkins, 49 Utah 598, 164 P. 867, the
Utah court, apparently for the first time, announced its
position with respect to sufficiency of negative testimony.
In this case, plaintiff, riding a motorcycle, approached a
horse and wagon traveling in the opposite direction. The
defendant was driving an automobile behind the wagon.
He turned out to pass the wagon and collided head on with
plaintiff's motorcycle. Both plaintiff and the driver of the
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wagon testified defendant did not blow his horn. The court
held that the defendant's positive testimony that he did
blow his horn was uncontradicted. We quote what we believe to be the pertinent portion of the court's opinion:

"* * * When we take into consideration that
the plaintiff, according to his own testimony, was
at the time without thought and wholly unaware of
the approach of defendant's automobile, that he was
seated on a motorcycle moving at the rate of 15 to
20 miles per hour, that his view of the traveled road
was obscured by Bryson's approaching wagon and
horses, and of necessity had to cross immediately to
the east side of the highway for safety and in passing the Bryson vehicle, and that the witness Bryson
was, at the same time, apprehensively riveting his
attention on the motorcycle approaching him, on account of his own safety, and through fear of the
horse he was driving making him trouble, we may
well believe these witnesses 'did not hear' the horn
sounded by the defendant on his approach.
"The weight of negative testimony of witnesses,
as to the giving of signals, ordinarily is for the jury
to determine; but when physical conditions and the
attending circumstances are such as to render it
highly improbable that they could hear, we think
the rule should be and is otherwise." (Italics ours.)
In Jensen v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 59 Utah 367,
204 P. 101, there was negative testimony that no warning
bell was rung by defendant's engine. This testimony was
from a boy standing near the track, alongside the deceased.
He and the deceased had their attention directed to another
engine approaching from the opposite direction. The court
held that this evidence did not present a conflict with posiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tive evidence that the bell was ringing and the whistle
blowing, and stated as follows:
"This is not a case in which the witness claims
to have been listening for signals and failed to hear
them. The witness in this case was not consciously
listening at all. His attention was directed in another direction, and his mind was engrossed with
other matters. Besides this, the freight train to
which his attention was directed was pulling upgrade and making considerable noise .. In view of all
of these circumstances and conditions, it cannot be
contended that the testimony of the witness Priest
to the effect that he did not hear the bell rung or
the whistle blow can be considered as evidence at all
that the bell did not ring or that the whistle did not
blow * * *"
"In the face of such evidence as this, together
with the conditions and circum~stances heretofore
enumerated, the writer is of the opinion that the
statement of the witness. Priest that he did not hear
the whistle blow or the bell ring created no conflict
in the evidence, and that therefore the testimony of
defendant's witnesses. as to the warning given stands
uncontradicted and unimpeached * * * "
The subject is again treated by the Utah court in Anderson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 76 Utah 324, 289 P. 146,
wherein the court announced the following standard in
measuring the sufficiency of negative testimony that no
whistle was sounded or bell rung:

"* * * T'o entitle negative testimony such
as that of Reddon and Thompson affecting the ringing of the bell and blowing of the whistle on the
occasion in question to any probative value, it must
be made to appear that they were paying some at-
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tention to what actually occurred and that they were
in a position where they could and did observe what
was done or what was not done * * *."
And in Clark, et al., v. Union Pacific, et al., 70 Utah
29, 257 P. 1050, the rule \Vas announced in the following
words:
"* * * Though a witness was not specially
listening for the signals, or giving special attention
to the occurrence, yet, if his attention was not engrossed or devoted to other things, and it being made
to appear that he was in position to hea.r, and in all
likelihood ~vould have heard them had they been
given, his testimony that he heard none is still of
probative value and is not to be disregarded, though
its weight be not regarded as great as the testimony
of a witness who testified that he was specially
watching and listening for signals, and heard none,
or of a witness that they were or were not given
* * *." (Italics ours.)
Finally, in Hudson v. Union Pac. R. Co. (not yet reported), the court concluded that the plaintiff's negative
testimony that no bell was rung and no whistle blown was
sufficient to create a conflict for the following reason, and
we quote from the court's opinion :

"* * * Mrs. Hudson was in a position where
it is likely that she would have heard the whistle
or at least the bell, and, as there is no evidence that
her attention was so absorbed in other matters that
she would not have heard, a jury question is presented." (Italics ours.)
In Bergman v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 14 F. 2d 580,
which is an opinion from the Eighth Circuit Court of ApSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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peals, two witnesses to a fatal railroad crossing accident
were in an automobile on the opposite side of the railroad
crossing and came to a stop at the crossing just as the train
passed. The weather was stormy, snow was falling, and
the wind was blowing so that the sound of a whistle or bell
would be carried away from these witnesses. The court, in
holding that the testimony of these two witnesses presented
no conflict with positive testimony that the crossing signals
were given, stated as follows:

"* * * The applicable rule, well established
by the authorities, is that, where the attention of
those testifying to a negative was not attracted to
the occurrence which they say they did not see or
hear, and where their situation was not such that
they probably would have observed it, their testimony is not inconsistent with that of credible· witnesses who were in a situation favorable for observation and who testify affirmatively and positively
to the occurrence * * *." (Italics ours.)
To the same effect see Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Anderson,
29 F. 2d 479.

Miller v. Abel Construction Co., 140 Neb. 482, 300 N.
W. 405, is a case in which the facts are quite similar to
the case at bar. In that case, plaintiff was riding in an
automobile being driven by her husband when it crashed
into a road roller being operated by one of defendant's employes. Plaintiff and her husband testified that the defendant failed to have a red light displayed on the rear
of the roller. As the automobile in which the plaintiff and
her husband were riding approached the roller, at nighttime, they passed another car traveling in the opposite
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direction, and the driver of each automobile dimmed his
headlights. Immediately on passing this automobile, plaintiff and her husband saw the roller for the first time, 10
or 15 feet in front of them. The court held that the testimony of plaintiff and her husband that there was no light
on the roller raised no conflict with positive testimony that
a red light was displayed. We quote from the court's decision in this case:
"The defendant's witnesses * * * testified
positively that the red lantern on the roller was
lighted prior to the collision. In the face of this
positive testimony that the red light was displayed,
the fact that there is testimony of one or more witnesses that they did not see it will not prevail against
the positive testimony of several witnesses in making
an issuable fact for the jury, where the attention of
the witnesses ~vas not directed toward the red light
at the time it is said to have been displayed, and
where their position, mental condition, and the surroundings were not such as would raise a presumption that they would have seen it· if it had been displayed * * *." (Italics ours.)
In Allison v. Boston & M. R., 88 N. H. 420, 190 A. 127,
defendant produced no positive testimony that the crossing
signals were given by its train crew. In this case, the accident occurred at a crossing on a foggy morning, and the
plaintiff testified he did not hear any warning signal, nor
did he see the defendant's train until an instant before
the impact, when he saw a "black flash." The court held
that, even though there was no positive evidence that the
proper warning signals were given, the plaintiff's negative
testimony was not sufficient to create a jury question on
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the issue of warning signals because his testimony amounted
to no more than a scintilla and provided no sufficient basis
for a verdict. The court held that the burden of proving
absence of warning signals rested upon the plaintiffs and
that they had failed to adduce any legally sufficient evidence in support thereof.

Markusfeld v. Zahn (Tex.), 99 S. W. 2d 438, is also
a case in which the facts are somewhat similar to the present one. Here the plaintiff and other witnesses, who were
riding in plaintiff's automobile, testified that they did not
see any clearance light on the defendant's truck as it approached them. It appeared, however, that plaintiff and
his witnesses were blinded by the headlights of the defendant's truck as it approached. The court held their
testimony that they sa.w no clearing light presented no
jury question, in the face of positive testimony that there
was such a light on the truck and that the finding of the
jury that the defendant's truck did not have a front clearance light was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong.
Wigmore states that before negative testimony can be
accepted it must be made to appear that the witness was
so situated that "in the ordinary course of events he would
have heard or seen the fact had it occurred." Wign~ore on
Evidence, Third Edition, page 778.
If we measure plaintiff's testimony In this case by
the standards set forth in the above cases, it becomes. clear
that it is insufficient to create a conflict with the defendant's positive evidence that the lights on the caboose were
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burning. Plaintiff did not see the caboose at all at the time
he claims to have stopped on the west side of the tracks.
He testified the headlight of the locomotive flashed across
the crossing, and he could not see anything down the Passing Track. He saw the caboose just momentarily, not more
than a second before the collision. He wasn't looking for
the caboose and wasn't expecting it. His eyes and his attention were directed to the stationary engine and the road
ahead. He didn't have an opportunity to look for details.
To him it was a large object, and nothing more, as he looked
up and caught a fleeting momentary glance a g.econd before the impact. One moment the plaintiff was proceeding
over the crossing, not looking down the Passing Track, entirely unapprehensive as to any approaching object. The
next moment he was rendered unconscious or dazed by the
shock of the impact; and in the intervening second plaintiff
had the fleeting glance upon which he bases his negative
testimony. It was for the trial court to determine whether
or not he had sustained the burden of showing that it was
likely, or that it was probable, or that in the ordinary course
of events he would see and remember that there were no
lights on the front of the caboose. It would have been improper for the court to submit this question to the juryjust as improper as it would be for a trial court to submit
to a jury the preliminary legal question as to the competency of offered testimony. If in granting the defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the court
decided this question against the plaintiff, it cannot be
said the trial court committed reversible error. This negative testimony offered by the plaintiff rests upon obser-
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vation so nebulous as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff saw and remembered the details of the caboose so that
he could speak authoritatively thereon. We submit that
the plaintiff did not sustain the burden of establishing the
sufficiency of his negative testimony and that there is
therefore no evidence which conflicts with the positive
testimony of defendant's several witnesses that lights were
burning on the front end of the caboose.
We proceed, then, to consider the plaintiff's conduct
from this view of the evidence. A brief review of plaintiff's testimony and of the defendant's undisputed evidence
will .be helpful in this analysis.
Plaintiff testified he knew there were three tracks at
this crossing. He saw the flasher signal working and
stopped at the signal. l-Ie did not look down the Team
Track; he did look down the Passing T·rack but could see
nothing. The locomotive headlight was flashing across the
crossing. The only inference from this testimony is that
he was trying to say and did say that he did not see the
approaching caboose because the locomotive headlight obscured his vision. Nonetheless, he proceeded across· the
tracks, keeping his eyes on the stationary engine and the
road ahead. The caboose and the trackage area were both
visible to persons on the west side of Highway 91. The
caboose was visible to the plaintiff as he proceeded down
Highway 91 toward the crossing, had he but looked effectively then. It was visible to him as he turned at the approach to the crossing. Accepting the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, it would have been visible to him
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at the crossing except for the fact that the flashing locomotive headlights obscured his vision.
A motorist's duty when approaching a railroad crossing which he knows is there, and over which he knows
trains operate, extends further than merely looking up and
down the tracks and listening for approaching trains. It
is his duty to look in such a manner and from such a position as to make his observation effective. In this case the
plaintiff proceeded blindly over the crossing, not knowing
whether it was safe to do so, or not. Unable to determine
without further effort if a train was approaching along
the Passing Track, the plaintiff took a chance and proceeded blindly across. After his first ineffective look down
the Passing Track, he did not even look down that track
again as he moved toward it but proceeded to and over the
Team Track and across the 45 feet between the T:eam Track
and the Passing Track, keeping his eyes on the engine and
the road ahead. Plaintiff negligently took a chance and this
chance resulted in the accident. He cannot hold the defendant for injuries thus sustained. As was simply and
succinctly stated by an early New Jersey court in Central
R. Co. v. SmaUey, 61 N. J. L. 277, 39 A. 695:
"The duty of a person who is about to cross a
railroad track is to be prudent, to look and to listen,
and to do the things that will make looking and listening reasonably effective. If the vision or hearing
of such a person is limited by permanent obstructions or disturbances, he should for that reason be
cautious. If his vision or hearing is limited by transient obstructions or disturbances, under circumstances which oblige him to rely on the sense thus
limited, he should wait until it has again become
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efficient to warn him of peril * * * To go on
a railroad crossing in the way of a train which can
be neither seen or heard, but which would he either
visible or audible except for some temporary hindrance to sight or hearing, is to he negligent."
In Bates v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 38 Utah
568, 114 P. 527, the plaintiff drove a horse and buggy
along a highway which paralleled the defendant's tracks
for some distance, and then turned to the right at a crossing to pass over this. track. He slowed up about 50 feet
from ·the track and glanced in the direction from which
the train approached but his view from that point was
partially obstructed by an embankment. He then moved
over the crossing without again looking in that direction
and was struck by defendant's train. The court held that
he was negligent as a matter of law, and in its opinion
quotes Elliott on Railroads, Volume 3, Second Edition, paragraph 166, as follows:
"The duty to look and listen requires the traveler to exercise care to select a position from which
an effective observation can be made. The mere fact
of looking and listening is not always a performance
of the duty incumbent upon the traveler, for he must
also exercise care to make the act of looking and
listening reasonably effective, and must usually continue to be on the lookout and exercise his faculties
until he has crossed * * * He must look and
listen for all trains, and not merely for some trains,
for he has no right to proceed upon the assumption
that trains will cross only at specified times. He
has, indeed, no right in any case to omit to take precautions for his own safety upon the supposition or
assumption that he may safely cross the track."
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See, also, for an announcement and application of the rule
that mere looking is not always sufficient, but that the
observation must be from a position where vision is not
obscured, Drummond v. Union Pac. R. Co., 111 Utah 289,
177 P. 2d 903; and Holmgren v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
Utah ... , 198 P. 2d 459.

Nabrotzky v. Salt Lake & Utah Ry. Co., 103 Utah 274,
135 P. 2d 115, was a case in which the facts. were quite
similar to those under consideration. The plaintiff N abrotzky knew that there were flasher signals at a three, track crossing, and because they were not operating he assumed that no train was approaching. As he proceeded
over the crossing his vision was temporarily obscured by
the glare from a nearby arc light. After holding, in line
with Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 79 Utah 439, 11
P. 2d 305, that the plaintiff could not rely solely upon the
flasher signals, the court decided the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The following language from the court's opinion is particularly applicable in characterizing the plaintiff's conduct in our
present case.
"He (the plaintiff) was conscious of the relative location of the tracks which were 37 feet apart.
He still had a duty to look in the directions from
which he knew the trains approached, and he could
neither plunge nor edge forward blindly into a
known danger zone. He had a duty to keep a proper
lookout for his safety and to avoid contact with
trains which he knew operated over such tracks at
frequent intervals. His view was unobstructed, and
he could have seen except for the fact he was blinded
momentarily and the further fact he did not bother
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to look to the right or to the left. He sought to excuse his admitted negligence in traveling forward
onto the track of defendant in a temporarily blinded
condition, by saying he heard no bell and no whistle.
In view of the fact the windows of his car were up,
the ordinary operation noise of a 1933 model automobile, and the fact he did not direct his attention
to any signal after he observed the flasher signal
was not working, he might very well not have heard
any sound from defendant's train. However, even
assuming such want of care on the part of defendant
as claimed by plaintiff, it did not excuse plaintiff's
palpable negligence."
To look when one's vision is obscured is no better than
to fail to look at all. The plaintiff Seybold, after his first
ineffective observation some 60 feet from the Passing
Track, moved forward blindly into a known danger zone,
without looking to right or to left. It is difficult to imagine
a clearer case of negligence than for one to proceed blindly
over a railroad crossing where a train might appear at any
moment, without first ascertaining whether or not it is
safe to do so. Assuming, as plaintiff in effect states, that
the defendant temporarily obscured his vision with its locomotive headlight, still this did not excuse him from making
effective observation along the Passing Track. Since he
failed to look while traveling along Highway 91 at a time
when the headlight would not interfere, it was his legal duty
to choose a spot to make his observation along the Passing
Track from which his observation could effectively be
made. A motorist approaching a crossing is not required
to choose the most advantageous position from which to
make his observation, but if there is a position nearby
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from which an effective observation can be made the fact
that the view is obscured from the place where he chooses
to look gives him no license to proceed blindly forward .
..

In Ulrikson v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. Ry. Co., et al.,
64 S. D. 476, 268 N. W. 369, there were two tracks at the
crossing where the accident occurred and these tracks were
15 feet apart. The plaintiff, who was familiar with the
crossing, looked down the main track when he was about
75 to 80 feet from the passing track and 90 to 95 feet
from the main line track. He observed no train approach
at that time. When he was about 35 or 40 feet from the
crossing, he again looked to the west, the direction from
which the train approached, but a glare caused by the setting sun prevented an effective observation. Nonetheless,
he proceeded forward and the train was first observed just
a moment before the impact. In holding the driver of the
automobile was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, the court stated as follows:

"* * * So far as the driver is concerned, the
general duty of care on approaching a railroad crossing has been rendered specific at least to the extent
that it is definitely established as the law of this
state that 'it is the duty of an automobile driver approaching railroad tracks to look and listen where
looking and listening will be effective, and that his
failure to do so is contributory negligence as a matter of law.' (Citing cases.)
"In the instant case the automobile driver was
intimately acquainted with the crossing in question,
having passed over it in the same direction, as he
himself says, more than a thousand times. He knew
that the view of the tracks to the west was obstructed
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by buildings and that there was really very little
vision to the west until the automobile reached a
point about 100 feet north of the tracks and that
from that point to the crossing visibility constantly
increased. He knew that it was about the hour for
the passage of a regular daily train from the west
which did not stop at that crossing. He looked to
the west at a time when he says he was protected
from the glare of the sun by the Williams' house and
at a point whence he estimated he could see along
the track to the west about 130 feet. As a matter
of fact, the visibility to the west from that point was
probably nearer 190 feet. In any event, he did not
see the train and in all probability it was not then
within the range of his vision. From that point he
continued on toward the track without any slackening of speed, and, while he states that he looked
again to the west, he frankly concedes that when
he did so the glare of the setting sun upon the windows of the automobile so blinded him that he could
see nothing. That such looking to the west was not
an effective looking within the meaning of our decisions is quite apparent. As stated by the Supreme
Court of Washington in a case where the driver was
blinded by an approaching headlight (Jaquith v.
Worden (1913) 73 Wash. 349, 132 P. 33, 37, 48 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 827), 'Had he been without eyes or
had he closed them, he would have been in no worse
position.' Nevertheless, with all the knowledge he
had, knowing that his only view of the track to the
west had been a short distance which he estimated
at 130 feet, knowing that thereafter, although visibility to the west increased, yet he could not see at
all when he looked to the west because of the blinding glare of the sun, this driver neither stopped his
car nor slackened its speed, but proceeded blindly
and heedlessly into the zone of danger. That he was
contributorily negligent within the rule of former
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decisions seems to us entirely clear. And such contributory negligence is not excused by the fact
(which we assume) that appellant railway company
negligently failed to maintain proper lookout when
approaching the crossing and negligently omitted to
sound proper signals therefor * * *."
In Lamely v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co., 298 F'. 916,
there were three tracks at the crossing. Plaintiff stopped
his truck about 10 feet from the nearest track and looked
to the east, the direction from which a train approached on
the middle track, but his view was obscured by railroad
cars on the nearest track and by ties piled alongside the
right of way. Nonetheless, he proceeded over the crossing
and was struck by the train. We quote the opinion of the
court, as follows :

"* * * After attempting to make the observation, and being unable to do so, plaintiff 'took his
chance' and drove across the track in front of an
oncoming train. Giving full faith to plaintiff's explanation of the reasons which actuated him, we are
unable to find any question for the jury. Respecting
the situation there is no confusion or uncertainty
due to conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's duty might
well be said to have been an absolute duty. It was
not one which might or might not have been recognized, due to the different views which different individuals might obtain from conflicting evidence.
If plaintiff was under any obligation to ascertain
at a highway crossing the coming of a train, we are
satisfied he did not meet it. Not having looked when
the view was unobstructed, he proceeded without ascertaining a fact essential to his safe passage.
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ing. Ordinary care required that he ascertain, by
the use of his various senses, whether trains were
coming; and if he neglected to look when the view
was clear, he should have ascertained the fact-not
me·rely 'looked' when the view was obscured or obstructed * * *.''
The plaintiff could have, without much inconvenience
to him, backed his truck a short distance to where an effective observation could have been made. By thus performing
the duty which the law imposes upon him, that is, the duty
of choosing a place from which an effective observation
can be made if one is available, this. accident could have
been avoided. If, then, we accept plaintiff's testimony in
all respects insofar as that testimony created a jury question, and if we analyze his conduct in the light of circumstances as thus revealed, we must conclude that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
The major portion of this brief has been devoted to
a consideration of this view of the facts because we believe
it is the only one that can logically be considered. To complete this discussion, we now assume, however, that this
view is not the proper one. We assume that the trial court
was obligated to accept as true all of the plaintiff's nebulous testimony and was further obligated to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom favorable to the plaintiff.
This is the second possibility mentioned in the first portion
of this brief.

C. Plaintiff was Guilty of Contributory Neg.ligence
as a Matter of Law if all of the Evidence Offered by the
Plaintiff is Accepted as True.
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The only difference between this view of the evidence
and the one just considered is that it is assumed, contrary
to the undisputed evidence, that there were no lights on
the defendant's caboose. V\'e assume also, of course, that
the defendant's engine was about 75 feet from the crossing; that none of defendant's employes were on the caboose;
and, further, that there was no employe guarding the crossing or warning the plaintiff by waving the lantern, or otherwise. A consideration of the plaintiff's conduct under this
evidence will lead to the same conclusion.
The plaintiff testified he stopped his truck at the
flasher signal; that he moved to the north up the Passing
Track but the headlight was flashing across the crossing
and he couldn't see anything; and he then drove his car
to and over the Team Track over the 43 feet separating
the Team Track and the Passing Track, and right up to
and upon the Passing Track, keeping his eyes on the engine
and the road ahead, and without making any further observation to determine if the Passing T'rack was clear. If
the defendant's caboose was not lighted perhaps the plaintiff could not be expected to see it when he looked froin a
position 60 feet west of the Passing Track. The fact remains, however, that his own testimony discloses that his
vision from that position was at least partially obscured by
the engine headlight. Even though he could not be expected
to see the caboose when he looked, the fact that he did not
have a clear vision imposed upon him the duty of either
moving hack out of the glare of the headlight or of proceeding cautiously toward the Passing 'frack, keeping his
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servation near the track before moving onto it with his
truck. The plaintiff testified he did not take any further
precaution with respect to the Passing Track after his. first
observation from a position back by the flasher signal. If
the plaintiff after his ineffective observation had moved
his truck back out of the glare of the crossing, he would
have seen an unlighted caboose moving south along the
Passing Track. The plaintiff testified that it wasn't very
easy to see at the crossing and that it was quite dark. This
statement does not conflict with the testimony of the defendant's witness Anderson that the trackage area north
of the crossing could be seen without difficulty from the
town of Roberts at that time of night nor with the testimony of the defendant's witness Tirre that from his. posi-·
tion on the west side of Highway 91 it was. easy to see the
Passing Track a moment before the collision. If the plaintiff did not want to move backward to a place where an
unobscured observation could be made, he should at least
have proceeded forward cautiously and made some observation when he was near the Passing Track.

"* * * where one enters the tracks of a railroad,
having complied with a fixed duty before entering,
he is not relieved of the obligation to continue to
look, and, if there is intervening space between the
tracks where the driver may better see and hear, he
is bound to stop, look, and listen quite as much as he
was before entering on the first track." Frank v.
Reading Co., 297 Pa. 233, 146 A. 598.
We do not claim that the law in Utah required the plaintiff
to stop before reaching the Passing Track, but it did require him to keep his automobile under control and, since

I I I
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he could not be sure whether there was a train on that
track or not, to make some further observation from a
point near the track. See Drummond v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
111 Utah 289, 177 P. 2d 903. There are many cases which
hold that a motorist must do more than merely look and
listen as he approaches the crossing but must be vigilant
every moment he is upon the crossing and that if the view
of any one of the tracks at the crossing is obscured the
motorist must approach that track cautiously and make
observation from a point near the track before proceeding
over it. See Witkowski v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 338 Pa.
510, 12 A. 2d 980; Scott v. Kurn, et al., 343 Mo. 1210, 126
S. W. 2d 185; Beckwith v. Spokane International Ry. Co.,
120 Wash. 91, 206 P. 921; Rule v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 107 Kan. 479, 192 P. 729; Grimsley v. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 187 F. 587; Ramsey v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 336 Pa.
498, 9 A. 2d 348. There was a space of approximately 60
feet between the place where he made his ineffective observation and the point of the accident; there was a space
of 43 feet after he passed over the Team Track within
which he could have kept his truck under control and made
some observation along the Passing Track. This he did not
choose to do but relied, instead, upon a previous observation which he knew afforded him no reasonable assurance
of safety. It is now plain that if the plaintiff had taken
this ordinary, reasonable precaution he could have and
would have seen the approaching caboose. This is absolutely demonstrated by the fact that he actually did see
it, lighted or not, when he was at or near the Passing
Track, even though he was neither looking for it nor pay-
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ing any attention at all to the track. The conclusion is inescapable, even accepting all of the plaintiff's testimony,
that he could have made an effective observation immediately before driving on to the Passing Track and that he
failed to do so. All of the cases we have been able to find
and which we cited herein define such conduct as negligence as a matter of law. Consequently, it matters not
what view is taken of the facts of the accident as disclosed
by the evidence. All paths lead to the same conclusion:
Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law.
D.
gence.

There was no Excuse for the Plaintiff's Negli-

Counsel for the plaintiff seek to excuse plaintiff's
heedless conduct by stating he was confused and apprehensive of da-nger from the stationary switch engine on the
main track north of the crossing. In support of this position they cite Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah
219, 134 P. 567, and Malizia v. _Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
53 Utah 122, 178 P. 756. The facts of this case do not
bring it within the rule as announced in the Newton and
Malizia cases. That rule is explained in Jensen v. Oregon
Short Line R·. Co., supra, as follows:
"The controlling fact * * * is that the person attempting to cross or use the street was at the
time of the accident apparently or actually confronted with a 'multiplicity of dangers' which tended
to confuse, mislead or disconcert the mind to such
an extent as to leave the matter of contributory negligence in doubt."
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The plaintiff was neither confused by nor reasonably apprehensive of personal danger from the stationary steam
engine. He observed that this engine was not moving.
While it is true he could not rely upon its not moving toward the crossing, still it did not interfere with or prevent
a safe movement over either the Team Track or the Passing Track. The Main Track upon which the engine was
standing was 60 feet from the Team Track and 17 feet from
the Passing Track. Plaintiff testified that he knew the
engine was on the Main Track, and he knew there were
two other nearer tracks at the crossing. He knew that the
engine was not a source of immediate danger to him while
moving over either of the two nearer tracks. It was neither
reasonable nor excusable that he should ignore the immediate potential danger from movements on the tracks
he was approaching in order to ·concentrate on an immobile
engine some distance north of the crossing on the last track
he was to cross. The "multiplicity of dangers" rule is a
good, humanitarian one when properly applied. It should
be limited, however, to a situation where the plaintiff is
actually and reasonably confused or apprehensive of immediate danger from other sources. It should not be used
as a sanction for heedless conduct where no actual or apparent multiplicity of dangers exists. An overextension of
the doctrine would destroy the balance which it creates.
The words of the court in Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line
R. Co., 35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466, are, we think, particularly
appropriate.

"* * * If it ordinarily constitutes negligence to disregard a duty imposed by law, there is
no reason why the one who fails to discharge the
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duty shall not bear the consequences of his own act
in so far at least as those consequences affect him,
unless the law affords him some excuse for omitting
to perform the duty imposed. The rule was not conceived for the purpose of shielding either the traveler or the railroad company. The company must for
its negligence respond to all who may be innocently
inj ur~d by a collision at a crossing as well as bear
the injury to its property. The only immunity it
obtains is against the traveler who, by his own careless act, brought on or directly contributed to his
own injuries, and the traveler is equally immune
against the conduct by the company for any injury
it may have sustained by a collision where the traveler and the company omitted an act required by law
or failed to exercise due care. In such event, in the
eye· of the law, the parties are in equal fault, and
hence will not be heard to complain of the concurring
acts of negligence as against each other. Under
the evidence in this case, no court would hesitate
to pronounce the act of the railroad company in not
giving any warning in approaching the crossing as
constituting negligence as a matter of law. By the
same token, the law ought not to shield the traveler
who omitted to perform a duty imposed upon him
for his own safety by the same law, and for which
omission he tenders no legal excuse. If the case
were one where the question was merely whether
ordinary care was or was not exercised in view of
all the circumstances, we would have no hesitancy
in leaving the questions of both negligence and contributory negligence to the jury. This is not such
a case, however. It is. a case where the law itself
declares that the omission to do a certain thing
constitutes negligence. In such a case we have no
right, whatever may be our desire, to cast the duty
we ought to discharge upon others. In such a case
the jury could, at most, excuse either the one or the
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other of the negligent parties from the consequences
of his concurring acts of negligence. This, in view
of the great danger incident to collisions on public
crossings, the law does not sanction, but requires
the court to pronounce judgment when the facts are
undisputed or conceded that the party complaining
is himself in fault. If once the rule be relaxed so as
to permit the traveler to say that there were other
things which diverted his attention, and for that
reason he did not look or listen when such things in
no way were threatening his personal safety, then
the rule may as well be abrogated, and the whole
matter be left to the jury in all crossing accidents, as
is done in other cases of injury through negligence.
We think where the evidence is clear, as in this case,
the rule is a wholesome one, and ought not to be
weakened by unsubstantial distinctions * * *."
When all the distinctions and excuses raised by counsel
for the plaintiff are viewed in the proper perspective, the
fact remains free from substantial doubt that the plaintiff
heedlessly drove his truck over the crossing. The only inferences that can be drawn from the evidence are that he
failed to look down the Passing Track at all, or that he
looked but failed to see what was to be seen, or, finally,
that he looked but failed to see the approaching caboose
because his vision was impaired and, yet, blindly took a
chance. He claims to have looked but to have seen nothing
because of the fact that the headlight obscured his view.
If true, this gave no license to assume that all was clear.
After such ineffective observation he should not have traveled the remaining 60 feet to the Passing Track without
looking to the north or to the south along that track. In
so doing, he breached the positive duty imposed l).pon him
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by law and was guilty of negligent conduct which proximately contributed to cause this accident. · The plaintiff
cannot complain that the trial court refused to let the case
rest with the jury because his own testimony demonstrated
his contributory negligence and removed any substantial
doubt as to the defendant's non-liability.

CONC.LUSION

The judgment which the court rendered against the
plaintiff was proper and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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